📄 Article
✓ Link checked
Free
Beginner
Why we picked it
This is the explainer written for exactly your situation: two founders, 50/50, no tiebreaker. It lays out the full menu you can put in your shareholders agreement before you need it, from a neutral third party who casts the tie-breaking vote, to a mediation step, to the buy-sell endgame, and names each shotgun variant (Russian Roulette, Texas Shoot Out, adjusted fair market value at a 125% buy or 75% sell) so you can pick one deliberately instead of discovering you have none.
From
SPZ Legal
by SPZ Legal
12 min read
- Bake the deadlock mechanism into the agreement while you still get along; retrofitting one mid-fight is nearly impossible
- A neutral third party who casts a tie-breaking vote keeps ownership 50/50 while ending the paralysis
- Shotgun clauses come in flavors (Russian Roulette, Texas Shoot Out, premium/discount buyout) and you choose the one that fits your cash reality
Open
spzlegal.com →
📄 Article
✓ Link checked
India
Free
Intermediate
Why we picked it
This is the worked mechanics of the buy-sell clause in Indian shareholders-agreement language, not a generic Western template. It walks Russian Roulette (you name a price, the other side chooses to buy you out or sell to you at that same price, so you never lowball) and Texas Shoot-out (sealed bids, highest bidder buys), and makes the point most founders miss: keep your list of Reserved Matters short, because an over-broad list turns trivial disagreements into deadlock triggers.
From
Mondaq India
by Mondaq (Indian corporate counsel)
10 min read
- Russian Roulette self-regulates pricing: naming your own number risks being forced to buy at it, so both sides bid honestly
- Texas Shoot-out uses simultaneous sealed bids to an independent third party, with the higher bidder obliged to buy
- A bloated Reserved Matters list manufactures deadlock; scope it to genuinely fundamental decisions only
Open
mondaq.com →
📄 Article
✓ Link checked
Free
Beginner
Why we picked it
The cleanest case for the answer's core move: appoint a chairman who holds a casting vote so an even split can still produce a decision. It separates prevention (casting vote, independent director, supermajority thresholds, put/call options drafted up front) from cure (mediation, forced buyout, winding up), which is the right way to think, you want the prevention list in your agreement so you never touch the cure list.
From
South Bank Legal
by South Bank Legal
9 min read
- A chairman with a casting vote is the simplest tiebreaker for an even shareholding
- Prevention lives in the agreement (casting vote, independent director, put/call options); cure means courts, buyouts, or winding up
- A winding-up petition is the nuclear fallback that exists precisely to push both sides back to the table
Open
southbanklegal.com →