5 resources from Kellblog we point people to, and the questions each answers.
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Kellogg's argument that churn has too many definitions to be trustworthy, and that private companies should measure NDR the way public ones do. The slides are the reference deck for this debate.
A former SaaS CEO showing exactly which metrics belong on which slide, in trailing nine quarter format. This is the closest thing to a standard board package and you can copy it as is.
Slide one is the good, the bad, and the ugly, owned by the relevant exec, before any metrics appear.
Slide two is key operating metrics on a trailing nine-quarter view, led by the SaaS leaky bucket (starting ARR plus new ARR minus churn equals ending ARR).
Calculate gross churn against available-to-renew only, not total ARR, or the number flatters you.
Slide three is P&L and cash: services at 10 to 20 percent of revenue, subscription gross margin 70 to 80 percent, plus Rule of 40 and CAC payback.
The single most common thing win/loss uncovers: you did not lose on product or price, you lost to the safe choice, higher up the org than you were selling. Read it for the counter moves, including his line that nobody ever got fired for buying the incumbent, but nobody ever got promoted either.
Kellogg's framing, that the ICP begins as a founder hypothesis and should end as a regression on renewal, expansion and win rate, is the whole argument for data over opinion in one sentence. He also makes you define what best means before you model anything.
An ICP should name firmographics, role and problem together, for example VPs of sales at technology companies with 500 million to 2 billion in revenue.
Use a bullseye: ring 0 is the ideal customer, outer rings are progressively worse fits, rather than one flat list.
By 50 to 100 million ARR your ICP should come from regression on your own data, not founder intuition.
Regression often moves the line: the real break may be at 250 employees when you had drawn the segment at 0 to 500.
Kellogg's point that a deal that died internally is a different animal from a deal you lost to a competitor, and that mixing them lets you report a 66 percent win rate while actually winning four opportunities in a hundred. Fix your categories before you trust any win/loss number.
